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Webster's dictionary defines "final" as "leaving no further chance
for action, discussion, or change; deciding; conclusive: a final
decree."' However, what constitutes final agency action is not as
simple to determine as Webster would like us to believe. On the
extreme ends of the final agency action paradigm, where an agency
has given its "final decree," or where it has yet to act at all, Webster's
definition of final would be an appropriate tool in determining final
agency action; it would yield the appropriate results. On the other
hand, anywhere between those two extremes, the definition given by
Webster merely seems to beg the question: when does an agency's
action demonstrate that there is no further chance for action,
discussion, or change? Nor does Webster's definition give us
guidance as to what kind of considerations should be taken into
account when attempting to determine the finality of an agency's
action. Should courts merely look to the agency itself, or should
courts also look at the effect that the agency's action will have on a
particular party? Due to the vagueness of the term "final," many
courts have struggled to determine what constitutes final agency
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action for those actions that fall between the two extremes.2 In
particular, in Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Product
Safety Commission,3 (Reliable) the D.C. Circuit was forced to decide
whether the actions taken by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) constituted final agency action within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), thus justifying
judicial review of the case. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit attempted
to further clarify what constitutes final agency action for those cases
that fall within the two extremes.
This note explores the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Reliable. Part II
details the historical background and procedural history of the case.4
Part III analyzes the majority opinion given by Circuit Judge Harry
T. Edwards.5 Part IV considers the judicial and administrative
implications of the Reliable decision.6 Part V considers decisions
from other Circuits that address the interpretation of final agency
action. 7 Part VI concludes the discussion of the Reliable decision
and the requirement of final agency review.8
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory History
In an effort to promote efficiency of administrative and judicial
2. See Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
173 F. Supp. 2d 41, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2001); Arch Mineral Corp. v. Babbitt, 104 F.3d
660, 665-68 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a preliminary decision by the Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), linking a corporation to
another company that owed OSM delinquent fees, was final action); Dietary
Supplemental Coalition, Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1992)(holding that the FDA's classification of a dietary supplement as a food additive
through regulatory letters was not final agency action); and Nat'l Parks
Conservation Ass'n. v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (1 lth Cir. 2003) (holding
that the NPS had not taken final agency action when it had yet to evict private
individuals from occupying structures in a public park because it had yet to
officially decide whether they would be allowed to stay).
3. 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
4. See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
5. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
6. See infra Part IV and accompanying notes.
7. See infra Part V and accompanying notes.
8. See infra Part VI and accompanying notes.
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resources, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)9 was created and
Congress included within it Section 704.10 Section 704 provides that:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action
or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review
on the review of the final agency action. Except as
otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action
otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section
whether or not there has been presented or determined
an application for a declaratory order, for any form of
reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise
requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior
agency authority. 1
Following the APA, "federal courts lack jurisdiction over
administrative action where '(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."'"12
Additionally, under Section 704 of the APA, in order for a federal
court to exercise judicial review of an agency's activities, there must
be a final agency action; that party must have exhausted the
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2004).
10. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating
that the reason the APA precludes interlocutory challenges to tentative
administrative rulings is because if it did not, the judicial system would
"improperly intrude[ ] into the agency's decision-making process" while needlessly
squandering judicial resources, "since the challenging party still enjoys an
opportunity to convince the agency to change its mind"); see also DRG Funding
Corp. v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 76 F.3d 1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(stating that the reason for final agency action is:
It allows the agency an opportunity to apply its expertise and
correct its mistakes, it avoids disrupting the agency's process,
and it relieves the courts from having to engage in "piecemeal
review which is at the least inefficient and upon completion of
the agency process might prove to have been unnecessary.
(citations omitted)).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (italics added by author).
12. Nat'l Parks, 324 F.3d at 1236-37 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2004)).
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procedures provided by the agency, and there must be no other
remedies at law. 13
Under the judicial review provisions of the APA (such as Section
704), subject to specific statutory exclusions, 14 the term "agency"
includes every governmental authority of the United States, even if it
is not subject to review by another agency. 15 A government entity is
included within the APA definition of "agency" if it has sufficient
authority to act with the power of the government behind it.16
However, due to concerns over separation of powers, this does not
include the President of the United States.' 7  But, it does include
virtually all executive agencies.
Not only does Section 704 of the APA only apply to "agencies,"
it also only applies to those activities that are classified as "agency
action."' 8 "Agency action," according to Section 551 of the APA,
includes an entire - or any part thereof - agency rule, order, license,
sanction, grant or denial of relief, or failure to act.' 9  Although an
agency's activity may be classified as "agency action," a court will
not intervene for a party that is subject to that action unless the
agency's action is final.2°
13. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(A)-(H).
15. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
16. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Harper, 587 F. Supp. 357, 364 (D.C.
Mass.).
17. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798 (1992) (addressing final
agency action and holding that the President of the United States does not fall
within the statutory definition of "agency," to justify judicial review over his
actions).
18. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. There must be "agency action" before there is even a
possibility that a judicial court can review any of the activities of the administrative
agency in question.
19. U.S.C. § 551(13) (2004). See also Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 435 (stating
that the "term 'agency action' encompasses an agency's interpretation of law.(citation omitted). It is therefore the finality of that interpretative position which is
relevant for purposes of determining the ripeness of the statutory question.").
20. 5 U.S.C. § 704; see DRG Funding Corp. v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
76 F.3d 1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that: "The requirement of a final
agency action has been considered jurisdictional," therefore, if "the agency action
is not final, the court ... cannot reach the merits of the dispute." (referring to
agency controversies brought before a federal court pursuant to a particular statute
that prescribes judicial review) (citations omitted)).
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According to the APA, "final agency action" is defined as a "final
disposition., 21  However, what constitutes a "final disposition" has
not been defined by the APA, and has instead been left largely to the
discretion of the courts to interpret. Although there is a strong
presumption in favor of judicial review of federal administrative
actions, 22 this presumption only applies after there has been final
agency action. 23 Therefore, what constitutes "final agency action"
must be determined by the courts on a case by case basis before an
agency's actions can be subject to judicial review.
B. Precedential History
The determination as to whether or not an agency's action is
sufficiently final to justify review by a federal court falls within the
court's ripeness24 analysis of the case.25 Courts attempting to
determine questions of ripeness begin the analysis with a
"presumption of reviewability. '"26 This presumption should be
particularly evident when the person affected by the agency action
was forced to choose "between disadvantageous compliance or
21. U.S.C. § 551.
22. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (stating that: "the
Administrative Procedure Act's 'generous review provisions' must be given a
'hospitable' interpretation," and that "only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict
access to judicial review." (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds,
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
23. Id. at 140 (stating that "[T]he Administrative Procedure Act provides
specifically not only for review of '(a)gency action made reviewable by statute' but
also for review of 'final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy
in a court."').
24. Ripeness is defined as: "1. The circumstance existing when a case has
reached, but has not passed, the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to
permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made. 2. The requirement that this
circumstance must exist before a court will decide a controversy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1328 (7th ed. 1999).
25. Gen. Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (following
Abbott Labs. and stating that: "To determine whether a controversy is ripe for
judicial review the court must evaluate 'the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision ... ". ' and that fitness is determined by deciding whether the agency's
action is sufficiently final. (citations omitted)).
26. Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 434.
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risking imposition of serious penalties. 27  In Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner,28 the Supreme Court developed a test to determine when
a case is ripe for judicial review. 29 In determining whether or not a
case is ripe for judicial review, a federal court must assess "the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the
parties of withholding court consideration., 30  The two
considerations "function as independent but related variables.'
However, when a court is dealing with tentative, or intermediate
agency decisions, "claims of hardship 'will rarely overcome the
finality and fitness problems inherent in attempts to review [those]
decisions."' 32
Within the D.C. Circuit, the first part of the Abbott test 33 is
evaluated through the consideration of three factors: 34 "[1] whether
the issue is purely legal, [(2)] whether consideration of the issue
would benefit from a more concrete setting, and [(3)] whether the
agency's action is sufficiently final. ' 35  In determining the finality
requirement, the Supreme Court, in Bennett v. Spear,36 established
27. Id.
28. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140-41.
29 See id. at 148-49.
30. Id. at 149.
31. See Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 434 (stating that:
Fitness and hardship function as independent but related
variables, the former as a measure of the interests of the court
and agency in postponing review and the latter as a measure of
the challenging party's countervailing interest in securing
immediate judicial review. The judiciary's ultimate
determination of ripeness in a specific setting depends on a
pragmatic balancing of those two variables and the underlying
interests which they represent).
32. DRG Funding, 76 F.3d at 1215 (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research
Group v. Comm'r, 740 F.2d 21, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the corporation's
claim of hardship is not sufficient to overcome the finality and fitness problems
because the agency's action does not effect the day-to-day business of the
corporation, nor has the corporation been forced to choose between
"disadvantageous compliance and risking serious penalties." (citations omitted)).
33. The first part of the Abbott test is the determination as to the fitness of the
issues for judicial review. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.
34. Gen. Elec., 290 F.3d at 380.
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (involving ranch operators and irrigation districts who
filed suit alleging that a position set forth in a Federal Fish and Wildlife Service
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two conditions that must be met in order to have "final agency
action." 37 The Court held:
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied
for agency action to be 'final': First, the action must
mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decision-
making process . . . it must not be of a merely
tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the
action must be one by which 'rights or obligations
have been determined,' or from which legal
consequences will flow.' 38
In Bennett, the Supreme Court had to determine whether or not a
position set forth in a Federal Fish and Wildlife Service Biological
Opinion (Biological Opinion or Opinion) constituted "final agency
action" within the meaning of Section 704 of the APA.39 In holding
the agency action final, the Court developed the above two
conditions and distinguished the case in front of the Court from two
previous decisions that held that the administrative action in question
was not final.40 The two cases the Bennett Court distinguished its
decision from were Franklin v. Massachusetts41 and Dalton v.
Specter.4 2
The Bennett Court distinguished its decision from the Franklin
and Dalton decisions because, "[u]nlike the reports in Franklin and
Biological Opinion concerning the proposed use of reservoir water to protect lost
river and various species of fish violated the Endangered Species Act).
37. See id. at 177-78.
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 177-79.
40. Id. at 178.
41. 505 U.S. 788, 798 (1992) (holding that the Secretary of Commerce's
presentation to the President of a report tabulating the results of a decennial census
did not constitute "final agency action" within the meaning of Section 704 of the
APA because the report carried "no direct consequences," and it appeared to be
"more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.").
42. 511 U.S. 462 (1994) (holding that submissions to the President by the
Secretary of Defense regarding recommended base closures were not sufficient to
constitute final agency action within the meaning of the APA because they were
not binding on the President; the President could either accept or reject the
recommendations).
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Dalton, which were purely advisory and in no way affected the legal
rights of the relevant actors, the Biological Opinion at issue [in
Bennett] ha[d] direct and appreciable legal consequences. 43 Since
the position set forth in the Biological Opinion had direct legal
consequences on ranch operators and irrigation districts, the Bennett
Court held that the position given in the Opinion was sufficiently
final and therefore constituted final agency action within the meaning
of Section 704 of the APA.44
Following the Bennett test and other case precedent on the subject
of finality,45 essentially the "core question [in the finality
determination] is whether the agency has completed its
decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one
that will directly affect the parties. 46 Therefore, an agency's action
that "does not itself adversely affect complainant but only affects his
rights adversely on the contingency of future administrative action,"
cannot be considered final agency action. 47 The D.C. Circuit decided
Reliable under the above statutory rules and case precedent.
C. Case History
In Reliable, the question before the court was whether the
commencement of an investigation by CPSC into the performance
reliability of Reliable's automatic sprinkler heads constituted "final
agency action" within the meaning of Section 704 of the APA.48
43 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178.
44. Id. at 178-79.
45. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001)
(holding that the EPA's rules revising national ambient air quality standards were
final agency action). "Only if the '[agency] has rendered its last word on the
matter' in question is its action ... reviewable." Additionally, following Bennett
the Court stated that the "action under review [must] 'mark the consummation of
the agency's decision-making process."' Id. (citations omitted)).
46. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 797; see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at 479 (stating that
the finality determination is made by looking at the agency's actions, and not the
words of its decision. "Though the agency has not dressed its decision with
conventional procedural accoutrements of finality, its own behavior thus belies the
claim that its interpretation is not final.").
47. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130 (1939); see also
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Herman, 176 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1999).
48. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 728-29.
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The appellant, Reliable, from 1973 to 1983, manufactured the
"Model A Flush" sprinkler head, which was incorporated into
automatic fire sprinkler systems throughout the United States.49
These fire systems were then placed in various commercial
buildings. 50
Pursuant to authority granted under the Consumer Product Safety
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq.,5 1 CPSC began investigating the
"Model A Flush" sprinkler head in 1999 in order to determine
whether or not it presented a substantial product hazard. 52 CPSC
claimed that it had gathered evidence sufficient to support a
preliminary determination that the "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads
presented a substantial product hazard as defined by the Consumer
Product Safety Act.53 Although CPSC had not yet made its
preliminary determination, in a letter dated September 11, 2000, it
informed Reliable that the "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads "present
a substantial product hazard, as defined by . . . 15 U.S.C. §
49. Id. at 730.
50. Id.
51. The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051, gives CPSC the
authority to conduct investigations into the safety of consumer products that fall
within the scope of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2054(b) (2004).
52. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730. One of the major responsibilities of CPSC is to
determine if "a product distributed in commerce presents a substantial product
hazard and [if] notification is required in order to adequately protect the public
from such substantial product hazard." 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c) (2004). If CPSC does
make a determination that a product presents a substantial product hazard, it can
order the manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of the product to bring the product
into compliance with safety standards; replace, repair, or refund the price of the
product; or give public notice of the defect. Id. However, CPSC can only issue a
compliance order after the affected parties have been given an opportunity for a
hearing pursuant to the APA. Id.
53. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730 (quoting Letter from Jimmie L. Williams, Jr.,
Counsel for Office of Compliance, CPSC, to Paul D. Derounian, Counsel for
Reliable (Sept. 11, 2000)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a). According to Section
2064(a), "substantial product hazard" is defined as:
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product
safety rule which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public,
or (2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect,
the number of defective products distributed in commerce, the
severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of
injury to the public.
15 U.S.C § 2064.
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2064(a)."54  In that same letter, CPSC, before it would make its
preliminary determination, requested that Reliable "take 'voluntary
corrective action' pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 1115.20(a)., 55 However,
at the time of trial, no voluntary corrective action plan had been
initiated by Reliable, nor had CPSC made a formal decision that the
"Model A Flush" sprinkler heads presented a "substantial product
hazard. 56  In fact, CPSC had not even begun the administrative
proceedings that are required to make the formal determination. 57
Instead, Reliable filed a complaint on January 9, 2001, seeking
declaratory relief.58 Specifically, Reliable sought a declaration that
its "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads were not "consumer products" 59
within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act, and
therefore that Reliable is not subject to the jurisdiction of CPSC.60
54. Id.
55. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730; see also Letter from Jimmie L. Williams, Jr.,
Counsel for Office of Compliance, CPSC, to Paul D. Deronian, Counsel for
Reliable (Sept. 11, 2000). According to 16 C.F.R. § 1115.20, CPSC, before
beginning the required administrative proceedings, can "attempt to protect the
public from substantial product hazards by seeking voluntary remedies," with one
of those remedies being "corrective action plans." 16 C.F.R. § 1115.20 (2004).
With "corrective action plans" the company itself, is given the opportunity to set
forth the remedial action it will voluntarily undertake to prevent the product in
question from being a substantial product hazard. Id. The plan the company
develops should set forth how it plans to notify the public of the hazard, and if it
will repair, replace, or refund the price of the product. Id. at § 1115.20(a). Since
the corrective action is voluntary, the request by CPSC "has no legal binding
effect." Id. Therefore, if the request by CPSC is not followed, then it can file an
official administrative complaint that initiates formal administrative proceedings.
15 U.S.C. § 1025.
56. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730.
57. Id. Following 15 U.S.C. Section 2064(c), (d), and (f), CPSC can only make
a formal determination after the interested parties have been given an opportunity
for a formal hearing pursuant to the APA in 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2004).
58. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730.
59. The Consumer Product Safety Act defines "consumer products" as:
[A]ny article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed
(i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or
temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or
otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment
of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household
or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise.
15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (2004).
60. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730.
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On July 27, 2001, CPSC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the court lacked jurisdiction over Reliable's claim because there had
not been final agency action within the meaning of Section 704 of the
APA.61 On November 28, 2001, the United States District Court in
the District of Columbia rendered its opinion as to the merits of the
case. 62 United States District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle, relying on
FTC v. Standard Oil,63 held that CPSC's "investigatory steps d[id]
not rise to the level of 'final agency action' within the meaning of
Section 704 of the APA. '' 64 The district court noted that Reliable
may suffer a burden from CPSC's investigation, but it is not a legal
burden that arises from final agency action.6 5  So holding, District
Judge Huvelle, granted CPSC's motion to dismiss on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction and ordered that Reliable's complaint be dismissed
with prejudice. 66
Following the decision in the district court, Reliable appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia. 67 At
the time of appeal Reliable still had not initiated a voluntary
corrective action plan, CPSC had not made a formal determination as
to whether or not the "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads present a
substantial product hazard, nor had CPSC filed an administrative
complaint, or initiated formal administrative proceedings. 68 In fact,
at the time of appeal, CPSC had not made a formal determination that
61. Reliable, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43.
62. Id. at 41.
63. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980) (holding that the
agency's issuance of an administrative complaint that gave reason to believe that
the plaintiff was violating the law was not final agency action).
64. Reliable, 173 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
65. Id. at 44-45. Following FTC v. Standard Oil Co., the Court stated:
[T]hat the FTC's decision [(FTC v. Standard Oil)] had no "legal
or practical effect, except to impose on Social the burden of
responding to the charges made against it," and while the burden
might be substantial, it was different "in kind and legal effect"
from the burdens imposed by conduct traditionally considered
final agency action.
Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
66. Id.
67. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 726.
68. Id. at 730.
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it had jurisdiction over Reliable's "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads. 69
The United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia
decided its case, Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer
Product Safety Commission, based on the above factual information
and background.
III. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
A. Reliable's Contention that the District Court's Dismissal of Case
Was Improper
Circuit Judge, Harry T. Edwards, delivered the unanimous
opinion for the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia.70 He
began his analysis by first addressing the district court's dismissal of
the controversy pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). 7 Reliable raised the issue of improper dismissal, claiming
that, in cases where judicial review is sought under the APA instead
of a statute that prescribes judicial review, the requirement of final
agency action is not jurisdictional under Califano v. Sanders.72 Since
final agency action is not jurisdictional under Supreme Court
precedent, Reliable argued that dismissal under Federal Rules of
Evidence 12(b)(1) was not proper.7 3 Judge Edwards did not believe
69. Id. Although CPSC had not brought administrative proceedings against
Reliable, CPSC had brought administrative proceedings pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
2064 against several other manufactures of similar sprinkler heads treating them as
consumer products. See CPSC Admin. Compl. 1, JA 59; CPSC Admin. Compl.
1, JA 166 (cited in Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730).
70. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 728-29. Circuit Judge Edwards was joined by Chief
Judge Ginsburg, and Circuit Judge Garland in the decision and opinion. Id.
71. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if
one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
72. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977) (holding that "the APA does
not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial
review of agency action").
73. Id.
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that Reliable's claim of improper dismissal would significantly alter
the outcome of the case to justify reversal of the District Court's
decision.74 Judge Edwards explained that "if there was no final
agency action here, there is no doubt that appellant would lack a
cause of action under the APA. Therefore, even though there was no
basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), we may properly affirm the
District Court's judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 75  Judge
Edwards assumed that there was not final agency action on the part
of CPSC, thus holding that since there was no final agency action, the
District Court's dismissal could be affirmed on the basis of Rule
12(b)(6).76
Although under the APA the issue of final agency action is not
jurisdictional per Califano v. Sanders, and therefore, not the proper
subject for a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal, Judge Edwards, in his ruling,
and additional case precedent make it evident that "final agency
action" is essentially jurisdictional.77 It is essentially jurisdictional
because a federal court can not decide a case involving an
administrative agency's decision (absent a statute that states
otherwise) without there being final agency action. 78  Since final
agency action is needed in order for a federal court to decide the
controversy in question, it would seem logical that final agency
action is essentially jurisdictional. Either way, whether the dismissal
74. Id. (stating, in regard to the claim of improper dismissal, that: "We need
not dwell on this issue, for it raises a question of no significance in this case").
75. Reliable. 324 F.3d at 731. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) states
in part: "[T]he following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: ... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted..." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
76. Id. The district court's decision could be affirmed on the basis of Rule
12(b)(6) because, according to the APA, final agency action is needed before a
federal court can grant a party its claim for relief against an administrative agency.
5 U.S.C. § 704. Therefore, without final agency action, Reliable has failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
77. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that a court may properly dismiss a party's claim pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if there has not been final agency
action); see also DRG Funding Corp. v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 76 F.3d
1212, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that: "The requirement of a final agency
action has been considered jurisdictional," therefore, "the agency action is not final
[and] the court... cannot reach the merits of the dispute" (citations omitted)).
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 704.
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takes place due to lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), or for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the question the court
needs to ask is the same: Is there final agency action within the
meaning of Section 704 of the APA? If the answer is no, the case
can properly be dismissed. However, according to the D.C. Circuit's
ruling in Reliable, and following the Supreme Court's ruling in
Califano, the proper method of dismissal would be Rule 12(b)(6).79
B. Reliable's Contention that CPSC's Conduct Constitutes as Final
Agency Action
Following Judge Edward's analysis of Reliable's claim of
improper dismissal, Judge Edwards focused on the question of
finality. 80  Citing the APA, he explained that the authority of the
district court "to review the conduct of an administrative agency is
limited to cases challenging 'final agency action."' 81 Following the
Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent, Judge Edwards then gave
the general rules as to what constitutes "final agency action."82
Within the D.C. Circuit, agency action is considered final if the
action is "definitive," and it has a "'direct and immediate ... effect
on the day-to-day business' of the party challenging the agency
action." 83 The agency action is considered final if it "imposes an
obligation" or to the extent that it "denies a right, or fixes some legal
relationship." 84  According to the court, in order for an agency's
action to be final, the conduct of the agency must demonstrate that
the agency considers the action final and that the action in question
yields some sort of consequence to the party challenging the action. 85
79. See Reliable, 324 F.3d at 731; see also Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
107 (1977).
80. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 731 (stating: "Having disposed of the threshold
issue, we turn now to the question of finality").
81. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704).
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980)).
84. Id. (citing Role Models Am., Inc. v. White, 317 F.3d 327, 331-32 (D.C.
Cir. 2003)). The court further explains that "[flinal agency action 'mark[s] the
consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process' and is 'one by which rights
or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow."
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)).
85. Id.
With the general rules regarding final agency action laid out, the
court begins its analysis as to whether or not CPSC's actions toward
Reliable were sufficient to be considered final agency action within
the meaning of Section 704 of the APA.86 Specifically, the court
must determine if CPSC's preliminary assumption that Reliable's
"Model A Flush" sprinkler heads are "consumer products" under the
Consumer Product Safety Act is "final agency action. '"87 Reliable
argued that CPSC's preliminary assumption that it had statutory
authority to regulate its sprinkler heads was sufficiently final to be
considered final agency action and warranted judicial review. 88
Although CPSC's conduct only resulted in pre-enforcement action,
Reliable contended that because that pre-enforcement action assumes
that CPSC has statutory authority to regulate it, then the assumption
of statutory authority was sufficiently final to be reviewed by the
court.
8 9
The court, however, "reject[ed] [Reliable's] line of reasoning. '"90
Because CPSC did not make any formal determinations, impose any
obligations on Reliable, or create a legal relationship with Reliable,
the court did not see its actions as final.91 The court pointed out that
CPSC had only asked Reliable to voluntarily comply with its request
for corrective action. 92 According to the court, the voluntary request
did not have the legal consequences or burdens that satisfy final
agency action under Section 704 of the APA.93 In analogizing to
86. Id. at 731-32. The court stated: "Certainly the agency's investigation
assumes for now that it has jurisdiction to regulate the sprinkler heads." Id.
87. Id. at 731. The court noted that both Reliable and CPSC acknowledged
that there had not been final agency action in regard to the preliminary
determination by CPSC that Reliable's "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads presented
a substantial product hazard as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a). Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (stating that: "Reliable argues that, because this is a challenge to the
agency's statutory authority to regulate, rather than to the substance of any
substantial hazard determination, the agency's pre-enforcement actions are
sufficiently final to warrant judicial review the agency's jurisdiction at this stage.").
90. Id.
91. Id. at 731-32.
92. Id. at 732.
93. Id. The court stated that:
No legal consequences flow from the agency's conduct to date,
for there has been no order compelling Reliable to do anything.
To be sure, there may be practical consequences, namely the
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FTC v. Standard Oil Co., the court noted that the filing of an
administrative complaint does not even constitute final agency
action. 94  The court recognized that CPSC's investigation into
Reliable's sprinkler heads does have consequences, but it noted that
"[these consequences attach to any parties who are the subjects of
Government investigations and that believe the relevant law does not
apply to them., 95
Even more significant to the court than the lack of obligations or
legal consequences being imposed was that CPSC had "not yet taken
the steps required under the statutory and regulatory scheme for its
actions to have any legal consequence. ' 96 Since CPSC is required to
hold formal, on-the-record hearings before it can make legally
binding determinations, its conduct prior to those hearings does not
have any legal effect and therefore cannot be considered final agency
action. 97 Additionally, the court emphasized that because there are
formal adjudication requirements that CPSC must follow, Reliable is
protected. The court stated that Reliable is protected by these
procedures because:
choice Reliable faces between voluntary compliance with the
agency's request for corrective action and the prospect of having
to defend itself in an administrative hearing should the agency
actually decide to pursue enforcement.
Id. at 732.
94. Id. (citing 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980) (finding that filing an administrative
complaint was not final agency action within the meaning of Section 704 of the
APA).
95. Id. The court stated that a party may defend on the grounds that the
Government lacks jurisdiction, but the party may not challenge that jurisdiction
before the Government has taken action to enforce the law. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The formal adjudication procedures are: (1) If, after an initial
investigation, CPSC determines that a product presents a "substantial product
hazard," it may file an administrative compliant. See 16 C.F.R. § 1025.11. (2) If a
complaint is filed, a full adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law judge,
with the right of appeal, must be granted. See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(0; 16 C.F.R. §
1115.21(a); & 16 C.F.R. § 1025. (3) If CPSC prevails at the hearing, it can order
the product's manufacturer to take corrective action. See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(d).
Compliance with CPSC's order at this stage is mandatory, and non-compliance
could subject the violator to an enforcement action. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2068(a)(5),
2069, 2070, 2071(a), (b).
In the event that the agency should decide to pursue
enforcement action against Reliable, the agency must,
in the course of the formal adjudication, afford
Reliable the opportunity to convince the agency that
the term "consumer product" does not include
Reliable's sprinkler heads and that the agency
therefore lacks jurisdiction to regulate them.98
Following this line of reasoning, the court maintained that
CPSC's actions toward Reliable could not be considered final agency
action within the meaning of Section 704 of the APA.99 According
to the court, Reliable's interest in not being forced to defend itself in
an unauthorized proceeding "is far less weighty than the court's
interest in conserving its judicial resources and discouraging the
flouting of administrative procedures."' 00 In regard to tentative or
preliminary enforcement actions taken by an administrative agency,
the court stated that its interest in postponing review is greater.'
0
'
Judicial review should be postponed when an agency's decision is
tentative because it would improperly intrude into the agency's
procedures. 10 2  Additionally, the court stated that if it were allowed
to perform judicial review at preliminary stages in an agency's
decisionmaking process, it would "squander judicial resources"
because the party still has an opportunity, through formal
administrative procedures, to get the agency to change its mind.'0 3
Therefore, in order to conserve judicial and administrative resources,
and to allow CPSC to complete its decisionmaking process, the court
held that "[s]o long as Reliable retains the opportunity to convince
the agency that it lacks jurisdiction over Reliable's sprinkler heads,"
98. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 742. The court went on to further emphasize that
CPSC had yet to even file an administrative complaint against Reliable. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("Judicial review at that stage improperly intrudes into the agency's
decisionmaking process")).
103. Id. (quoting Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436).
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it would not intervene. 104
Reliable, however, argued that CPSC's determination as to itsjurisdiction over its sprinkler heads was not tentative, or
preliminary.10 5 Reliable contended that CPSC had made up its mind
and that it no longer had an opportunity to convince CPSC that it
lacked jurisdiction over Reliable's "Model A Flush" sprinkler
heads. 10 6  Because CPSC had previously brought administrative
proceedings against manufactures of similar sprinkler heads, and
treated those sprinkler heads as "consumer products," Reliable
argued that CPSC had already decided that it had jurisdiction over
Reliable's sprinkler heads.10 7 Since CPSC already decided that it had
jurisdiction in other cases, according to Reliable, its conduct
regarding jurisdiction over Reliable's sprinkler heads sufficiently
demonstrated final agency action within the meaning of Section 704
of the APA.10 8  The court, however, did not agree that CPSC's
determination in previous cases rendered its decision as tojurisdiction in this case final. 109  The court stated that in those
previous cases, as well as in the present case in front of CPSC, the
agency "never considered the issue raised by Reliable.... , 0 CPSC
had yet to officially decide through its formal adjudication
procedures whether or not it had jurisdiction over the type of
automatic sprinkler heads in question."' Even if it had made a
jurisdictional determination as to other manufactures of sprinkler
heads, the court stated that "it does not follow.., that the agency will




108. Id. Reliable contended that the previous automatic sprinkler head cases,
where CPSC's conduct demonstrated that it had jurisdiction, were a series of
agency pronouncements and, following Ciba-Geigy, a "series of agency
pronouncements" can demonstrate final agency action. Id. at 734 (quoting Ciba-
Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436 n.7).
109. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 733.
110. Id. The court noted that in the other sprinkler cases cited by Reliable as
demonstrating that CPSC had determined that it had jurisdiction over Reliable's
sprinkler heads, in "all but one of those cases, only administrative complaints were
issued.... And in the one case in which an AU actually rendered an opinion...
[CPSC] never passed on the issue because the case was settled. Id.
111. Id.
use its resources to proceed against Reliable."" 2 Furthermore, the
court stated that Reliable is protected by the formal adjudication
procedures that CPSC is required to follow when it makes a
determination.t 13 Since Reliable is entitled to a hearing in front of
CPSC, it is guaranteed the opportunity to plead its case as to CPSC's
lack of jurisdiction over its sprinkler heads. Therefore, the Court
held that CPSC's informal, preliminary determinations of regulatory
jurisdiction over other manufactures of similar sprinkler heads did
not make its conduct with Reliable final agency action within the
meaning of Section 704 of the APA. 1
4
Reliable attempted to bolster its argument that CPSC's conduct
sufficiently demonstrated final agency action by trying to draw
analogies between its case and the D.C. Circuit precedent that
addressed the issue of finality. 15  Reliable relied on three cases
where pre-enforcement agency action was considered sufficiently
final to allow judicial review of the agency's decision." 6 Reliable
argued that the court should treat its case like Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.
EPA, 117 Athlone Industries, Inc. v. CPSC,118 or Atlantic Richfield Co.
v. U.S. Department of Energy;"9 and find that CPSC's pre-
enforcement actions were sufficiently final to justify the courts
review. 12  However, the court did not agree that the cases cited by
112. Id. The court noted that just because CPSC had brought administrative
proceedings against other manufacturers of similar sprinkler heads, administrative
proceedings would be necessarily be brought against Reliable. Id.
113. Id. The court stated:
If the agency does decide to pursue a complaint, Reliable will be
afforded a hearing in which it will have ample opportunity to
convince the agency against the assertion of regulatory
jurisdiction and create a record for judicial review should that
later be deemed necessary. And a hearing before the
Commission will not be an idle gesture, because the agency has
made it clear that the interpretation of "consumer product" with
respect to sprinkler heads remains to be determined.
Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 733-35.
116. Id. at733.
117. 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
118. 707 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1983).
119. 769 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
120. 324 F.3d at 733.
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Reliable as precedent were directly analogous to its present
situation. 121 The court then proceeded to take each of the cases cited
by Reliable as precedent and distinguish them from the facts before
the Court. 12
2
1. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA123
Ciba-Geigy, the court noted, involved the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) mandating that labeling changes be made
for a registered pesticide by a specified deadline. 2 4  The EPA
imposed the labeling changes on manufacturers without providing
notice or the hearing procedures required by the statute that gave it
jurisdiction. 125  In Ciba-Geigy, the EPA sent a letter to the
manufacturer of the pesticide which ordered a labeling change of the
pesticide and requested "immediate compliance."'' 26 Since the letter
required immediate compliance, the court in that case held that the
letter "unequivocally" stated the EPA's position that Ciba-Geigy was
not entitled to a cancellation hearing. 27 The unequivocal nature of
the letter, coupled with the fact that it gave no indication that the
agency's decision was subject to further review, suggested to the
court that the EPA's action was final. 128
The Reliable Court emphasized that in Ciba-Geigy, the EPA's
121. Id. The court stated: "Reliable argues that we should interpret Standard
Oil narrowly here, and find that the agency's actions in this case are also
sufficiently final to warrant judicial review. We reject this invitation, because the
cases cited by Reliable do not support review here." Id.
122. Id. at 733-35.
123. 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
124. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 733-34 (citing Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436-37).
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436-37).
127. Id. at 733.
128. Id. at 733-34; see also Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436-38 (stating:
Once the agency publicly articulates an unequivocal position,
however, and expects regulated entities to alter their primary
conduct to conform to that position, the agency has voluntarily
relinquished the benefit of postponed judicial review.... We
conclude, as this court has repeatedly held before, that "an
agency's interpretation of its governing statute, with the
expectation that regulated parties will conform to and rely on this
interpretation, is final agency action fit for judicial review").
position was unambiguous and did not provide for further agency
consideration. 129 In comparison, however, CPSC had yet to make an
"unequivocal statement of the agency's position on the meaning of
'consumer product' or on the agency's jurisdiction over Reliable's
sprinklers."'' 30  The court noted that CPSC had merely requested
voluntary corrective action; it did not mandate that Reliable comply
with its request as the EPA did in Ciba-Geigy.'31  Furthermore,
should CPSC ever initiate administrative proceedings against
Reliable, the court noted that Reliable is entitled to formal
administrative hearings to try to persuade CPSC that it does not have
jurisdiction.' 32 After looking closely at the Ciba-Geigy decision and
comparing it to the facts in front of the Court, it held that CPSC's
conduct toward Reliable was too dissimilar from the actions taken by
the EPA against Ciba-Geigy to sufficiently satisfy the Ciba-Geigy
precedent. 133
2. Athlone Industries, Inc. v. CPSC
134
Next, the court addressed the case of Athlone Industries, Inc. v.
CPSC.135 In Athlone, CPSC assessed the plaintiff civil penalties for a
statutory violation through an administrative proceeding.' 36  The
plaintiff, believing that CPSC lacked the statutory authority to assess
the civil penalty against it, sued to enjoin CPSC from enforcing the
penalty. 137 The Athlone court held that judicial review of CPSC's
129. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 733-34.
130. Id. at 734.
131. Id.; see also Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 437 (holding that the "EPA's
steadfast failure to initiate a cancellation proceeding, coupled with the
representations of its counsel that EPA construes its statute not to require such a
hearing before imposing labeling changes, only serves to confirm the finality of the
agency's pre-litigation position.").
132. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734; see also Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436-37
(where "the agency denied the plaintiff any opportunity to be heard," and instead
mandated that they comply with its requested labeling change).
133. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 733-34.
134. 707 F.2d 1485, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
135. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734; see also Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1486.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1486-87.
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actions was appropriate. 138  Since the court was reviewing the
agency's statutory authority, it held that Athlone did not have to
exhaust all administrative remedies before obtaining judicial
review. 139 The court emphasized that judicial review of statutory
authority is allowed because of the "purely legal nature of the
issue."' 140 In determining statutory authority, the court stated that it
does not need to develop the facts behind the case, nor is there the
need for the court to rely on the expertise of the agency. 141
Additionally, the court noted the futility for Athlone in resorting to
further administrative proceedings because it was "highly unlikely
that the commission would change its position if the case were
remanded to it.' 142  Therefore, because the issue of statutory
authority raised in Athlone was purely legal, and any further
administrative proceedings would more then likely be futile, the
Athlone court held that CPSC's actions were sufficiently final to
justify judicial review. 143
In the present case, the Court noted that the issue raised by
Reliable was more of a factual question versus the legal issue that
was addressed in Athlone.144 According to the Court, "whether the
statutory term 'consumer product' includes Reliable's sprinkler heads
is not a purely legal one since the application of the statutory term to
the sprinkler heads would clearly involve the resolution of factual
issues and the creation of a record."'145 Since the determination is
factual in nature, the Court inferred that unlike the Athlone case,
agency expertise would be helpful in determining whether or not
Reliable's "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads fall within CPSC's
statutory definition of "consumer product."' 146  Consequently, the
138. Id.; see also Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1489.
139. Id.; see also Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1489.
140. Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1489 (quoted in Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734).
141. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734 (citing Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1489).
142. Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1489 (quoted in Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. In order to determine whether or not the sprinkler heads fall within
the definition of "consumer products," the court would have to develop a factual
record to determine where and how the sprinklers are used, and who the intended
consumers are, and compare those facts to the statutory definition and other cases
where the product in question was held to be a "consumer product." Id.
146. Id.
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court held that the facts before it in Reliable were not sufficiently
similar to the facts in Athlone to allow the court to follow it as
judicial precedent. 147
Reliable argued that its facts were similar to those in Athlone
because in both cases further administrative proceedings would be
futile. 148 Reliable contended that, as CPSC had done in Athlone, it
had made up its mind regarding jurisdiction and it was not going to
change, even if Reliable was given the opportunity to try to change
it.149 However, the court did not see CPSC's formal administrative
adjudication proceedings as yielding a "pre-ordained" answer to
Reliable's question regarding jurisdiction.' 50  Quoting the district
court's decision, the court held that "Reliable 'may be able to
persuade an administrative law judge that the manner in which its
sprinklers are produced and marketed, and the locations in which
[they] are installed demonstrate that they are not 'consumer
products."' "151 Since the court believed that Reliable would have the
opportunity to convince CPSC that it lacked jurisdiction over
Reliable's sprinkler heads, the court held that the case was not similar
to Athlone. 152
3. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S. Department of Energy153
Lastly, the court addressed the case of Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
U.S. Department of Energy.'54 In Atlantic, the U.S. Department of
Energy, through its administrative proceedings, requested discovery
of confidential information in the plaintiff's possession.' 55  The
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. The court noted that Reliable "claims that it is highly unlikely that the
agency will change its position and that resort to the agency's adjudicatory
proceeding would be futile." Id.
150. Id. According to the court, "nothing in the record indicates that the
outcome of a hearing, where Reliable will have the opportunity to present its
arguments to the agency, is preordained." Id.
151. Id. (quoting Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 173 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51 (D.D.C. 2001)).
152. Id.
153. 769 F.2d 771.
154. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734-35.
155. Id. at 735 (citing Atlantic, 769 F.2d at 783).
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plaintiff, not desiring to turn over the confidential information,
brought suit in federal court, questioning the statutory authority of
the agency to order the type of discovery at issue in the case. 156
Following Athlone, the court held that the question regarding the
statutory authority of the agency was a legal issue that did not require
agency expertise. 157 Additionally, the Atlantic court noted that any
attempt by the plaintiff to resort to the administrative adjudication
procedures of the agency would have been futile because the agency
operated under the premise that it had the authority to act in the
questioned adjudicatory capacity. 58 Due to the futility of following
the administrative procedures and the strictly legal aspects of the
issue, combined with the legal consequences that the plaintiff could
have suffered for not complying with the agency's discovery orders,
the court held that the agency's actions were final and ready for
judicial review. 159
As Judge Edwards and the court did not find Reliable's argument
of sufficient factual similarity to Athlone to have merit, neither did it
find any similarity between its facts and the facts in Atlantic.160
Specifically, the court held that the consequences of failing to
comply with the agency's request were significantly different in the
two situations. 16  In Atlantic, failure to comply could have resulted
in direct and immediate legal consequences, however, if Reliable
failed to comply with the "voluntary corrective action" request, the
court noted that it would not suffer any immediate legal
156. Id.
157. Id. at 734-35. The question of statutory authority was considered strictly
legal because it had to do with the authority of the Department of Energy to
adjudicate remedial orders itself and impose discovery sanctions in those
proceedings. Atlantic, 769 F.2d at 782. The case did not require factual
development of the issues, merely a straight interpretation of the statute. Id.
158. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 735 (citing Atlantic, 769 F.2d at 782).
159. Id. (quoting Atlantic, 769 F.2d at 783-84) (stating that Atlantic was "faced
with the dilemma of having to [choose] between complying with allegedly ultra
vires discovery orders - and thus revealing materials that otherwise would remain
confidential - and flouting the orders and facing the consequences should the
Department ultimately be found to have the power to issue the order.").
160. Id.
161. Id. The court stated that the issue faced by Reliable "is not analogous to
the plaintiffs dilemma in [Atlantic]." Id.
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consequences.162 In fact, according to the court, if Reliable failed to
comply with the request by CPSC, there is only the "possibility" that
it would have to defend itself at an administrative hearing. 63 As the
court points out, there is still the possibility that CPSC may not
pursue the matter at all, or that it could find, after further review, that
it does not have statutory jurisdiction over Reliable's "Model A
Flush" sprinkler heads."' 164 Therefore, because the issue in Atlantic
was legal in nature, and the consequences of failing to comply with
the agency's orders were significantly greater than those faced by
Reliable, 165 the court held that the two cases were not sufficiently
similar to justify following Atlantic as precedent. 166
Following its analysis of the facts in Reliable and the case
precedent cited by Reliable, the court held that CPSC's preliminary
determination that Reliable's "Model A Flush" sprinkler heads were
"consumer products," and thus subject to the court's jurisdiction, was
not "final agency action" within the meaning of Section 704 of the
APA. 167  Essentially, the court held that informal agency decisions
that have no legally binding effect are not considered "final agency
action" under the APA.168 Since these agency decisions are not
considered "final agency action," they are not subject to judicial
review. 69  Utilizing the rule that it just established, the court
affirmed the judgment of the district court and dismissed the action




165. The court tends to make it seem as if the consequences faced by Reliable
in its present situation are non-existent because, according to the court, Reliable
still has the opportunity to persuade CPSC to find that it does not have jurisdiction
over Reliable's sprinkler heads. See id. at 734.
166. Id. at 733.
167. Id. at 735.
168. See id. at 732-33.
169. See id. at 731 (stating that "[T]he District Court's authority to review the
conduct of an administrative agency is limited to cases challenging 'final agency
action."'); see also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2004).
170. Id. at 735.
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IV. IMPACT
The aftermath of the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Reliable will not
likely be exceptionally far reaching. 171 In the end, the decision given
by the court in Reliable does not appear to extend or change previous
D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court precedent on the interpretation of the
requirement of final agency review. 172 What the decision may do is
clarify the finality holdings in earlier D.C. Circuit opinions where
preliminary agency action was held to constitute final agency action
within the meaning of Section 704 of the APA. 173
A. Judicial Impact
At the time the author wrote this note, several cases addressing
the issue of "final agency action" had been decided subsequent to the
decision in Reliable. 174 In several of the cases, the court discussed
the decision in Reliable as precedent. The D.C. Circuit decided one
of those cases, and the District Court for the District of Columbia
recently decided two additional cases. The three District of
Columbia decisions are: Croplife America v. EPA; Collagenex
171. See Croplife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (declining
to extend the ruling in Reliable to the case before it).
172. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (holding that in order for agency action to be
considered sufficiently final, "it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory
nature. And second, the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have
been determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow."'); see also Ciba-
Geigy, 801 F.2d at 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that in determining whether or not
there has been final agency review, the court should look at "whether the agency's
position is 'definitive' and whether it has a 'direct and immediate ... effect on the
day-to-day business' of the parties challenging the action." (quoting FTC v.
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 243 (1980)).
173. See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d 430; Athlone, 707 F.2d 1485; Atlantic,
769 F.2d 771; see also, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020-23
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that an EPA guidance document that reflected a settled
agency position and had legal consequences for those subject to its regulation, was
final agency action for the purpose of judicial review).
174. See Croplife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Collagenex
Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, No. CIV.A.03-1405, 2003 WL 21697344 (D.D.C July
22, 2003); F.L. v. Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2003).
24-2
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson; and F.L. v. Thompson. 175
1. Croplife America v. Environmental Protection Agency17 6
In Croplife, the petitioners brought suit in federal court to
challenge a December 14, 2001 directive issued by the EPA 177
announcing a moratorium on the use of third-party human test data in
its decision making process over pesticide registration.1 78 Prior to the
December 14, 2001 directive, the EPA in October 2001 had "made
[it] clear that it would consider data from third-party human studies
on a case-by-case basis."' 79  The petitioners argued that the
December 14th directive was unlawful because it was a binding
regulation that was not issued by the EPA through the formal
procedures required by federal statute.1 80  Additionally, the
petitioners argued that since the directive was a binding regulation
that will adversely affect them, it is the proper subject for judicial
175. See Croplife, 329 F.3d 876; Collagenex, 2003 WL 21697344; Thompson,
293 F. Supp. 2d 86.
176. 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
177. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §
136 (2000) (FIFRA), and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §
301 et seq. (FFDCA), the EPA oversees the regulation of pesticides.
178. Croplife, 329 F.3d at 880. Human test data was important because, under
FIFRA, in order for the EPA to grant registration to a pesticide, it must determine
whether that pesticide would produce an "unreasonable risk to man," or whether
that pesticide would result in a "human dietary risk." 7 U.S.C § 136(bb). "In
determining whether pesticide tolerances are safe, [the] EPA may consider the
validity of the available data from studies, anticipated and actual residue levels of
the pesticide in or on foods, the percent of food actually treated with the pesticide,
and international standards." Croplife, 329 F.3d at 879 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§
346a(b)(2)(D)-(F), (b)(4) (2000)).
179. Id. at 879. This October announcement came after the EPA, since the late
1990's, had been reevaluating its practice of relying on data from third-party
human studies in previous decades. Id. at 876. During this reevaluation period, the
EPA would consider third-party human studies on a case-by-case basis, and only if
the tests met the highest ethical standards. Id. at 877. The October 2001,
announcement merely clarified the case-by-case procedure that the EPA had been
using since the late 1990's. Id. at 876.
180. Id. at 878. Petitioners complain that the December 14, 2001, directive
was in fact binding, and "was issued without the notice of proposed rulemaking and
period for public comment mandated by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act." Id. (citations omitted).
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review. 181 The EPA on the other hand, contended that the December
14, 2001, directive was not a binding regulation. 182 Specifically, the
EPA argued that "the matter in dispute is not subject to judicial
review, that petitioners lack standing, and that the challenge is not
ripe for judicial review." 1 83
The court in Croplife first addressed the issue of whether or not
the December 14, 2001, directive was a "binding regulation." 184 Due
to the "clear and unequivocal language" of the directive, the court
held that it was a binding regulation "directly aimed at and
enforceable against petitioners."' 85 In its holding, the court stated
that "[tlhis clear and unequivocal language, which reflects an obvious
change in established agency practice, creates a binding norm that is
finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is
addressed."' 186 The EPA attempted to convince the court that the
directive was not binding because it specifically stated that the EPA
would consider third-party human test data if legally required to do
sO. 187 According to the EPA, the legally required language refers to
Administrative Law Judges as being "authorized to rule on particular
third-party human studies after [the] EPA completes its review of a
pesticide without the agency considering [the] data."' 8 8 Therefore,
according to the EPA, the directive was not binding because the
third-party test data will still be reviewed by the EPA in its decision
making process if mandated to do so by an AL. 189
181. Id.
182. Id. at 881.
183. Id.
184. Id. The court noted that the "principle issue in [the] case [was] whether
the EPA directive that is included in the December 14 Press Release constitutes a
binding regulation." Id.
185. Id. The letter states that "the Agency will not consider or rely on any
[third-party] human studies in its regulatory decision making." Id.
186. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
187. Id. According to the court the EPA letter stated that it would consider
third-party human data if it was "legally required to consider or rely on such human
study." Id.
188. Id. at 882.
189. Id. In regard to the EPA's argument, the court noted that "the reality of
agency operations makes it clear that ALJs cannot independently rule on the
legality of third-party human studies, because they may not ignore the
Administrator's unequivocal statement prohibiting the agency from considering
Finality: What Constitutes Final Agency Action?
In an attempt to strengthen its argument that the directive was
non-binding because it was subject to review by an AU, the EPA
pointed to Reliable190 as supporting precedent. 191 However, Circuit
Judge Edwards 192 held that Reliable is not similar to the case at
hand. 193 So holding, the court pointed out that in Reliable, the court
did not find final agency action on the part of CPSC because "[no]
legal consequences flow[ed] from the agency's conduct ... for there
ha[d] been no order compelling Reliable to do anything."'' 94
Additionally, the court pointed out that in Reliable, according to
CPSC's statutory requirements, Reliable would have the chance to
present arguments to an AU in formal adjudicatory proceedings. 95
Conversely, the court noted that, in the present case, the EPA's
December 14, 2001, directive has legal consequences that cannot be
raised in formal administrative proceedings.' 9 6 Specifically, the court
stated that the directive issued by the EPA has "legal consequences
that are binding on both petitioners and the agency, and petitioners
will be afforded no additional opportunity to make the arguments to
the agency that they now present in this petition."' 197 Consequently,
since the EPA directive had legal consequences, and the petitioners
would be unable to raise the issues presented at an administrative
hearing, the court held that the case is "inapposite" to Reliable and
that the issues presented are sufficiently final to justify judicial
review. 198
such studies." Id. (quoting Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir.
1993) ("It is commonly recognized that ALJs are entirely subject to the agency on
matters of law").
190. Reliable, 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
191. Croplife, 329 F.3d at 882.
192. Circuit Judge Edwards is the same judge that drafted the Reliable opinion.
See Reliable, 324 F.3d at 728-29.
193. Croplife, 329 F.3d at 882.
194. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Reliable, 324 F.3d at 732).
195. Id. (citing Reliable, 324 F.3d at 729).
196. Id. The petitioner's arguments cannot properly be raised in administrative
proceedings because they concern questions of law and policy. See, e.g., Ass'n of
Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984)
(stating that "[a]lthough an ALJ may dispute the validity of agency policy, the
agency may impose its policy through the administrative appeals process").
197. Croplife, 329 F.3d at 882.
198. Id.
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Within months of deciding Reliable, Judge Edwards, in Croplife,
returned to the question of finality and further clarified his decision
in Reliable.199  This case, in its brief analysis of Reliable,
demonstrates the important aspects of Reliable.200 According to the
court, Reliable stands for the proposition that there is final agency
action when legal consequences flow from the agency's conduct, and
the petitioner would be unable to, or it would be futile to, raise those
legal issues in an administrative proceeding in front of an AU.2 °1
The court's holding in Croplife does not expand or diminish the
importance of the D.C. Circuit ruling in Reliable. In fact, the court's
ruling in Croplife seems to fall within its ruling in both Ciba-Geigy
Corp. v. EPA20 2 and Athlone Industries, Inc. v. CPSC, 20 3 which were
distinguished in Reliable from the court's decision. 20 4 Therefore, the
Croplife decision adds clarity to the Reliable decision by further
focusing in on the importance of the agency's adjudicatory process in
the court's finality analysis.20 5
2. Collagenex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson20 6
In Collagenex, the district court for the District of Columbia had
to determine whether or not the response made by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA),2 °7 in response to Collagenex's request that it
not approve any generic drugs modeled after its drug Periostat,
199. Croplife was decided on June 3, 2003, only a month and a half after the
court rendered its decision in Reliable. See Croplife, 329 F.3d at 876; Reliable, 324
F.3d at 726.
200. See Croplife, 329 F.3d at 882.
201. Id.
202. 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
203. 707 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir 1983).
204. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. In both cases, final agency
action was found due to the unequivocal nature of the agency's conduct and the
lack of the opportunity for the petitioners to have their issues heard in a formal
administrative hearing.
205. See Croplife, 329 F.3d at 882.
206. No. CIV.A.03-1405, 2003 WL 21697344 (D.D.C July 22, 2003).
207. The FDA is given the statutory authority to investigate the efficacy and
safety of new drugs and determine if they should be placed on the market.
Collagenex, 2003 WL 21697344, at * 1.
constituted final agency action. 20 8 Collagenex manufactures a drug
called Periostat that is used to treat adult perionditis.20 9 The FDA
originally approved Periostat as an "antibiotic drug" within the
meaning of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.21° Collagenex
objected to the FDA defining Periostat as an "antibiotic drug" so it
appealed to the FDA to reclassify the drug.211 While Collagenex
was appealing to the FDA to reclassify its drug, it pulled Periostat off
the market and requested that the FDA not approve any ANDA
applications212 prior to the situation being resolved.213  Since the
FDA was on the verge of approving generic equivalents to Periostat,
Collagenex sued in federal court for review of its actions and the
issue of an injunction.214
In determining if the case was proper for judicial review, the
court addressed the finality of the agency's determination. 215 The
FDA argued that Collagenex was not harmed by the agency's action
because it had not approved any generic equivalents to Periostat
yet.216  Since it had not made final approval of the ANDA
applications, the FDA contended it had not completed final agency
action, and therefore its actions in regard to ANDA applications for
Periostat generics were not the proper subject of judicial review. 217
Citing Reliable,218 the court agreed with the FDA that the ANDA
208. Id.
209. Id. at * 3.
210. Id. Because Periostat was approved as an "antibiotic drug" it was not
eligible for exclusive market protection or patent protection that is available to non-
antibiotic drugs. Id.
211. Id.
212. A manufacturer files an ANDA application in order to get the approval
by the FDA to market a generic copy of a drug. In order to get approval: "[The]
ANDA applicant must certify (1) that no patent has been filed with the FDA; or (2)
that the patent has expired; or (3) that the patent has not expired, but will expire on
a particular date; or (4) that the patent is either invalid or the generic drug will not
infringe it. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Collagenex, 2003 WL
21697344, at * 2.
213. Id.
214. Id. at * 1.
215. Id. at * 4.
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Shalala, 182 F.3d 975, 978 (1999) (holding that
FDA's acceptance of ANDA applications is not final agency action)).
218. 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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applications were not a proper subject of judicial review.219  The
court held that since the FDA had not issued responses to the
requested applications, there had not been final agency action, and
the issue was not ripe for judicial review.22°
The Collagenex decision cites Reliable as precedent, but it does
not expressly aid in the understanding of the circuit court decision.22'
However, it does go along with the main rule articulated in Reliable
and further emphasized in the Croplife222 decision.223 Although not
articulated by the judge in Collagenex, the court followed the core
rule from Reliable when it did not find final agency action. 24 In
Reliable, the court stated that there was not final agency action when
the challenging party had not suffered a legal consequence from the
agency's action and the challenging party still had an opportunity for
a formal hearing on the matter through the agency's adjudication
procedures. 225 Just as in Reliable, the petitioner in Collagenex had
not suffered any harm from the FDA's actions regarding ANDA
applications, nor had the FDA's review process been fully
completed.226  Although not articulated by the district court, the
Collagenex decision appears to be a textbook application of the
finality rule laid out by the D.C. Circuit in Reliable.
3. F.L. v. Thompson227
In F.L. v. Thompson, the court was asked to decide whether there
was final agency action when the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR) declined to decide if a consent request should be granted and
instead transferred the request to the Department of Homeland
219. Collagenex, 2003 WL 21697344, at * 4.
220. Id. The court did issue an injunction to prevent the FDA from approving
any ANDA applications before it resolved its dispute with Collagenex. Id. at * 11.
221. See id. at * 4.
222. Croplife Am. v. E.P.A., 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
223. See Collagenex, 2003 WL 21697344, at * 4; see also Reliable, 324 F.3d
at 733; Croplife, 329 F.3d at 882.
224. See Collagenex, 2003 WL 21697344, at * 4; see also Reliable, 324 F.3d
at 733.
225. See Reliable, 324 F.3d at 733.
226. Collagenex, 2003 WL 21697344, at * 4.
227. 293 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2003).
Security (DHS).228 The plaintiff,229 a minor in United States custody,
sought consent from ORR to allow the state courts in Michigan to
exercise jurisdiction over him.230 When ORR transferred the request
to DHS, the plaintiff sued in federal court claiming that it was ORR's
responsibility under the Homeland Security Act and that by ORR
transferring the request to DHS, he suffered harm.231  ORR, on the
other hand, claimed that the plaintiff's cause of action was not ripe
for review by a federal court.232 According to ORR, the case was not
ripe for review because the agency had yet to fulfill the final agency
action requirement of Section 704 of the APA.233
The court, quoting the Reliable decision as precedent, held that
ORR had made its final determination and that the case was ripe for
judicial review. 234 In doing so, the court held that the plaintiff had
suffered an injury and that, based on the unequivocal language of
ORR's letter declining to decide the issue, it was clear that the
decision had been made and final agency action had taken place.
235
Furthermore, the court inferred that because the question at issue was
legal in nature, it was proper for the court to decide.
236
The decision given by the court in F.L. v. Thompson clearly falls
within the rule laid out by the court in Reliable. As required by the
Reliable rule, the plaintiff in F.L. v. Thompson suffered a legal
consequence, and additional appeals to the adjudicatory process
228. Id. at 88.
229. The plaintiff is a seventeen year-old from Tanzania. Id. He came to the
United States on a Boy Scout trip in 2001 where he left his group, was picked up
by the FBI, and placed in INS custody. Id. He has been with a foster family in
Michigan since 2001. Id. at 89.
230. Id. The plaintiff wanted the state of Michigan to have jurisdiction before
his eighteenth birthday so that after he turned 18, he would be able to apply for a
SIJ visa, which would protect him from deportation from the United States. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 90.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 93.
235. Id. at 89. The court found the plaintiff had suffered harm in the fact that
"[h]e has a legally protected interest in obtaining a decision from the properly
authorized governmental agency as to whether the federal government will grant its
consent to a state court's exercise of jurisdiction over him." Id. at 92.
236. Id. The question was legal in nature because it required a determination
as to what agency has the statutory authority to issue the consent decree. Id.
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would have been futile because the issue was legal in nature.237
Since the core aspects of the rule from Reliable were met, the court
properly concluded that ORR had committed final agency action
when it unequivocally declined to decide the plaintiffs request for
consent.2
3 8
The judicial impact of the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Reliable will
have, and has already had, an impact on cases decided within the
D.C. Circuit.239 However, since the case is more of a clarification of
the rule given by the Supreme Court in Bennett v. Spear,24 ° the
impact that it will have on other circuits' finality determinations is
less clear.
B. Administrative Impact
The impact that the Reliable decision will have on administrative
bodies will not be extremely significant. However, that is not to say
that the case will not have ramifications on how administrative
agencies operate. Since Reliable clarifies the Supreme Court's ruling
in Bennett v. Spear, administrative agencies would be foolish not to
heed the guidance that it gives. By analyzing the ruling in Reliable,
an administrative agency should be able to pin-point when its
conduct constitutes "final agency action" and when its conduct will
not. 24 1 If the agency can pin-point what actions constitute final
agency action subjecting it to potential judicial review, the agency
can attempt to avoid those procedures to try and avoid judicial
237. Id. at 93; see also Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734.
238. Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
239. See Croplife, 329 F.3d 876; Collagenex, 2003 WL 21697344; F.L. v.
Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 2d 86.
240. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78 (stating:
As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency
action to be 'final': First, the action must mark the
'consummation' of the agency's decision making process, it must
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second,
the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been
determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow.'
(citations omitted)).
241. See generally, Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734.
242
review. Under Reliable, there are two key questions that an
administrative agency needs to ask to determine if it may be subject
to judicial review for its actions. Those two questions are: (1) are
there questions as to the agency's statutory authority to perform the
actions in question, 243 and (2) are there formal adjudicatory means by
which a party challenging the agency's actions can appeal to the
agency and reasonably expect a fair result.244 If the answer is yes to
question number one and/or no to question number two, the agency
will more than likely find its actions subject to judicial review. Since
the decision in Reliable could aid an agency in determining when its
actions may be subject to judicial review, potentially conserving
resources, administrative agencies will probably evaluate the D.C.
Circuit's opinion in Reliable and adjust procedures in conformity
therewith.
V. DECISIONS FROM OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUITS
Since the two seminal cases on finality are Supreme Court
cases, 245 all of the circuit courts follow essentially the same rules.
246
What differs from circuit to circuit is the clarity of those rules as
established by precedent in the particular circuit. The following is a
brief analysis of other circuits' case precedent regarding final agency
review.
242. Following Reliable, if an issue raised by a challenging party is factual in
nature, meaning that it does not involve the statutory authority of the agency to
regulate, and the administrative agency does not make an unequivocal
determination on the issue, there will not be "final agency action" as long as the
party has formal administrative proceedings through which to appeal the decision.
Reliable, 324 F.3d at 732-33.
243. If there are questions as to the agency's statutory authority, the issue
raised will likely be legal and not the proper subject for administrative review. See,
e.g., Athlone, 707 F.2d at 1489.
244. If a party is unable to reasonably appeal the agency's decision through a
formal administrative adjudicatory procedure, a court is probably going to hold that
the agency's action is final. See Reliable, 324 F.3d at 734.
245. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967).
246. See generally, Arch Mineral Corp. v. Babbitt, 104 F.3d 660, 665 (4th Cir.
1997).
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A. The Second Circuit
According to the Second Circuit, the "finality requirement is
concerned with whether the initial decision-maker has arrived at a
definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete
injury. '247  In Top Choice Distributors, Inc. v. United States Postal
Service,24 8 the Second Circuit held that the Postal Service's filing of
an administrative complaint was not final agency action, and
therefore the Postal Service's action was not subject to judicial
review.2 49 In making its decision, the Second Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court's precedent in Bennett v. Spear and FTC v. Standard
Oil Co.250 The court primarily focused on the fact that the Postal
Service had not completed its decision making process and that the
plaintiff had yet to suffer any direct consequences. 251 Additionally,
unlike the D.C. Circuit in Reliable, the Second Circuit in Top Choice
distinguished between the requirement of finality (a requirement of
the APA) and that of exhaustion of remedies (a judge-made
creation). 252 Following the Supreme Court in Darby v. Cisneros, the
Second Circuit held that although the two requirements would yield
the same results, where the agency has not finished its decision-
making process the appropriate reason for dismissal is due to the
requirement of finality. 3
B. The Fourth Circuit
Under Fourth Circuit precedent, an agency's action is deemed
247. Top Choice Distribs, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 138 F.3d 463, 466(2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144 (1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
248. 138 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 1998).
249. Id. at 467.
250. Id. at 466.
251. Id. at 467. The court stated that "[t]he Postal Service has done nothing
here other than file an administrative complaint. Its decision is not final until the
time to appeal the ALJ decision runs or the Judicial Officer resolves the appeal.
Thus there has been no definitive agency decision." Id.
252. Id. at 466. "[E]xhaustion .. . refers to administrative and judicial
procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision ......
Id. (quoting Darby, 509 U.S. at 144).
253. Id.
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final for purposes of Section 704 of the APA "where the issues to be
considered are purely legal ones and where the agency rule or action
giving rise to the controversy is final and not dependent upon future
uncertainties or intervening agency rulings." 254  In Arch Mineral
Corp. v. Babbitt,255 the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement (OSM) linked the plaintiff's corporation to a company
that owed delinquent fees and penalties to OSM. 256 Once linked,
OSM sought payment from the plaintiff.257  Protesting to being
linked with the other company, the plaintiff filed suit in federal
court. 258 OSM argued to the court that the case was not ripe for
judicial review because its enforcement actions against the plaintiff
were not final.259 OSM contended that it had not yet made an official
decision to link the plaintiff to the company in question.260 Although
OSM did not make a formal determination, the court, after looking at
the unequivocal language in the letters, found that OSM had made its
decision to link the plaintiff.261 OSM argued that it should have been
given more time to attempt to make a formal determination and
address the issues raised by the plaintiff.262  However, the court
stated that "[w]hile it is generally true that judicial review awaits the
issuance of a formal administrative order enforceable against a
person or class of persons, such action is not an absolute prerequisite
to judicial review. 263  The court then went on to embrace the
reasoning of the First Circuit when it held that OSM's actions were
sufficiently final because they constituted an adoption of a position
that the agency is going to take toward the plaintiff in the particular
regulated industry. 264  Additionally, unlike the D.C. Circuit in
254. Charter Fed. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 976 F.2d 203, 208
(4th Cir. 1992).
255. 104 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 1997).
256. Id. at 662.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 665-66. "OSM focuses its argument on convincing this Court that
the agency's enforcement action against Arch was not final ..... Id.
260. Id. at 666.
261. Id. ("For all practical purposes, however the decision has been made.").
262. Id.
263. Id. at 667 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
264. Id. at 667-68 (quoting Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 662, 664
(1st Cir. 1965) (holding that the Civil Aeronautics Board took final agency action
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Reliable, the Fourth Circuit kept a clear distinction between the two
prongs in the Abbott test.265 In Reliable, the court almost blended the
two prongs of the test when it emphasized that a court should
consider the "day-to-day" consequences of the challenging party in
its finality determination. 266 On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit
does not really focus on consequences until it addresses the second
prong of the Abbott test, keeping it a legitimate two prong test.
C. The Seventh Circuit
Within the Seventh Circuit, an agency's action of issuing an
administrative complaint is not a final, judicially reviewable
action. Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has imposed the finality
requirement as a bar to interlocutory challenges that raise preclusion
in order to cut off agency proceedings.268 In R.R. Donnelley & Sons
Co. v. FTC, the plaintiff sought federal court review of an FTC
interlocutory determination not to apply collateral estoppel in
resolving the plaintiff's issues that he claimed had already been
decided by a district court. The court concluded that it could not
review the agency's decision as to collateral estoppel because the
merits of the administrative proceeding had not been determined, and
the FTC had not made a final ruling. 269 The plaintiff argued that FTC
administrative procedures were flawed and that any attempt to
exhaust the procedure would be too costly.270 The Seventh Circuit,
however, was not sympathetic to the plaintiff when it stated that "[i]f
the cost, delay, and aggravation of litigation made an order final, the
distinction between interlocutory and final decisions would collapse,
when it published its interpretation of the Federal Aviation Act as applied to the
facts alleged by the plaintiff in the case)).
265. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, the Supreme Court developed a test
to determine when a case was ripe for judicial review. In determining whether or
not a case is ripe for judicial review, a federal court must assess "the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration." Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140-41.
266. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 730.
267. See Buntrock v. SEC, 347 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2003).
268. See R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. FTC, 931 F.2d 430, 432-33 (7th Cir.
1991).
269. Id. at 431.
270. Id.
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and courts of appeals would be deluged.,
271
D. The Ninth Circuit
In determining final agency action, the Ninth Circuit looks at
whether the agency action is legal in nature and "whether the agency
action represents the final administrative work., 272  Following this
rule, the Ninth Circuit has held that a federal court should not review
anything less then the final administrative determination in regard to
technical and scientific information. 273  In Dietary Supplemental
Coalition, Inc. v. Sullivan, the FDA's classification of a dietary
supplement as a food additive through regulatory letters was not
considered final agency action within the meaning of Section 704 of
the APA. 74 Since the determination as to the particular classification
of food additives was not purely legal, and the court would benefit
from the particular expertise of the administrative agency, the court
held that the issue was not the proper subject of judicial review. 275 In
regard to final agency action, the Ninth Circuit takes a very similar
view to that of the D.C. Circuit as expressed in Reliable. The Ninth
Circuit's focus on the legal nature of the issue and the required
expertise falls in line with the Reliable decision.2 7 6  The main
difference between the two circuits is that the D.C. Circuit, under the
Reliable decision, considers whether or not there are adequate formal
administrative adjudicatory proceedings that are still yet to be
followed in the finality analysis. 277 In comparison, the Ninth Circuit,
like several other circuits, does not consider the administrative
proceedings of the agency until its exhaustion analysis.278
271. Id.
272. Dietary Supplemental Coalition, Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562 (9th
Cir. 1992).
273. Id. at 563.
274. Id. at 564.
275. Id. (stating "the decision to classify a product as a 'food additive' is a
fact-based determination and judicial review prior to final agency action would
'deny the [FDA] the full opportunity to apply its expertise and to correct errors or
modify positions in the course of a proceeding."') (citations omitted).
276. See id. at 563-64.
277. Reliable, 324 F.3d at 733
278. See Dietary, 978 F.2d at 564.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit's ruling in Reliable may not have significant, far
reaching implications in regard to its social implications, but it will
affect administrative agencies. The decision could affect procedures
that administrative agencies implement in order to protect against
potential, yet needless litigation. Through Reliable, administrative
agencies, as well as those challenging administrative action, are
given a clearer picture as to what constitutes final agency action.
Although the definition given by the D.C. Circuit in Reliable is
significantly better than that given by Webster's Dictionary, it still
has yet to fully define, with complete clarity, that which may be
indefinable - final agency action.
